US Congress’ Democratic sweep intensifies pressure on Modi’s governance, despite enduring strategic convergence
Bharat Bhushan
The Democratic Party’s electoral sweep of both chambers of the US Congress presents a two-front dilemma for the Narendra Modi government. It must simultaneously navigate an unpredictable and transaction-oriented US President Donald Trump, and an empowered US Congress controlled by Democrats who have tended to be quite vocal about domestic governance in India.
Trump’s electoral setback will further erode the value of Modi’s personal relationship with Trump that went beyond conventional diplomatic engagement, although it had begun to produce diminishing returns in Trump’s second term. India faced a 50% tariff on its exports, pressure on Russian oil imports, sending back Indian illegal immigrants in fetters, visa restrictions on Indian professionals, and a high-profile promotion of diplomatic partnership with Pakistan.
Trump’s transactional style had also given Modi room to manoeuvre domestically and avoid uncomfortable questions. The issues of domestic political developments were segregated from the issues of bilateral engagement by Trump.
A US Congress controlled by Democrats will, however, change the environment in which Modi operated. It may be far less accommodating precisely on the domestic issues that Trump kept at bay. Far from rehabilitating or enhancing Modi’s international standing, this merging of the two may highlight the contradictions in his foreign policy and domestic political positioning.
It is not as if Trump’s electoral defeat in the US Congress will entirely remove his influence. He may still use the executive powers of the president to demonstrate that he remains decisive in matters of consequence in foreign policy.
Trump has been fairly unpredictable in the recent past, combining faint praise of Modi with punitive pressure on trade, Russian oil, defence co-operation, and India’s relationship with other countries. Modi will, therefore, have to face both a deteriorating and undependable relationship with Trump along with a more demanding scrutiny of India’s domestic institutions by the US Congress.
Prominent Democrats (like Pramila Jayapal) have been critical of the Modi government on minority rights, religious polarisation, restrictions on free speech, and limits placed on civil society. Such scrutiny will also have direct consequences for Modi’s global as well as domestic political image.
Reports such as those of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which has designated India as ‘Country of Particular Concern’, are likely to get much more play in a Democrat controlled US Congress. The 2025 report of USCIRF recommended targeted sanctions against India’s external intelligence agency R&AW for extrajudicial targeting of Sikh separatists who are US citizens. Its 2026 report extended the demand for asset freezes and entry/visa bans on the RSS for alleged violation of religious freedom. Although the USCIRF reports are not binding, they are bad propaganda for the Modi government and that will get a louder play.
So, while a Democratic Congress will not abandon India nor make human rights the core principle of US foreign policy, it will not give Modi the free pass that Trump did. Democrats have an ideological distrust of Modi and they view his domestic politics with deep suspicion.
Taken together, this could mean greater Congressional scrutiny — committee hearings, letters signed by Congressmen, and conditional resolutions on religious freedom and conversion laws, human rights violations, minority rights, and electoral institutions may abound, for example. There could also be use of stricter language on the state of civil liberties in India in US State Department reports; greater scrutiny of transnational activities such as alleged plots against dissidents abroad; etc.
Yet the US’ strategic interests will ensure that there is no fracture in India-US ties.
Despite Modi’s timidity over Chinese transgressions against India, countering China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific will remain a compelling reason for the Democrats to nurture ties with New Delhi. The Quad, as an institution, is an important reflection of that convergence of views between the two nations. However much they might dislike Modi’s domestic politics, abandoning India for that will weaken the strategic approach of the US to this region.
Similarly, the Democrats will protect the co-operation in defence and military technology. They would want to continue promoting interoperability, sharing secure data and streamlining joint operations in the region based on the foundational defence agreements signed between the two countries. These institutional arrangements are not dependent on the personal relationship between Trump and Modi.
Co-operation under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), covering semiconductors, AI, quantum computing, telecom, space, and defence innovation, is likely to deepen to protect US economic and security interests and supply chains. This bipartisan US interest in deepening co-operation is not only commercially beneficial to both countries but also necessary for maintaining technological leadership against China.
For Democrats, the concern for reducing US vulnerability to Chinese supply chain disruptions would mean that initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership and bilateral supply-chain co-operation will remain unaffected. Co-operation on energy transition and climate change — both high on the agenda of the Democrats traditionally — will also see continuity. Some irritants in the field of energy like Russian oil imports will probably coexist with greater US energy exports to India.
On trade, the disagreements over tariffs, agricultural restrictions, intellectual property protection, and market access will remain contentious. However, eventually compromises will be found as the Democrats have no obvious interest in deliberately sacrificing the opportunities offered by the Indian market.
It seems clear that Trump’s electoral setback weakens the value of Modi’s personalised diplomacy, while the Democratic control of US Congress will expose the Modi government to greater scrutiny without fundamentally undermining the strategic India-US relationship. Indian diplomacy must, therefore, move from a leader-centric engagement towards an institution-centred, interest-based and genuinely multi-aligned diplomacy.
To some extent the Modi government had already begun adjusting its foreign policy. Having burnt its fingers in dealing with Trump, India pushed back while diversifying its trade portfolio, securing alternative trade agreements with individual countries to build long-term resilience.
India can learn from its own diplomatic history — after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship with Russia survived because it was built on enduring strategic and institutional interests. The relationship with the US needs similar resilience without becoming an alliance of dependence.
https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/modis-trump-card-just-lost-its-value-4209702
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