Comparing Israel’s Leaders to Genghis Khan Insults the Mongols

Genghis Khan conquered brutally, but strategically. Israel’s leaders wage endless war without clear goals or the means to achieve them. The Mongols, at least, eventually made peace with their enemies

Reuven Amitai

In his thought-provoking article on the eve of Sukkot, Haaretz military analyst Amos Harel quoted at length some sharp and troubling remarks by Brig. Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. Speaking at the university, Orion said:

“We’ve adopted a kind of Genghis-Khan style logic: [we’ll remove] any communities in Gaza and Lebanon near our border, so that terrorists won’t hide behind their civilians. That’s becoming the standard. The goal of this war was set as absolute victory, like an unreachable horizon. The result is an endless war, politically beneficial to the government because it limits protest and criticism on the grounds of [the old Israeli idiom]: ‘Quiet, we’re shooting.'”

Now that the famous conqueror and founder of history’s largest contiguous land empire has been invoked in the Israeli context, it is worth taking a closer look at his exploits and those of his descendants. Do they have any bearing on current affairs in our corner of southwestern Asia?

No serious scholar of the Mongol Empire in the 13th and 14th centuries, or of Chinggis Khan (yes, that’s how it’s spelled), would downplay the scale of the slaughter and destruction that often accompanied Mongol conquests and imperial expansion. There was, in part, a rational calculation behind devastation on such a scale: to terrify their enemies, deepen their despair and make them more willing to surrender.

During his campaigns from 1219 to 1221 in Central Asia and the northeastern reaches of the “Middle East,” in what is now Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, northern Afghanistan and northeastern Iran, Chinggis Khan probably intended to create a vast “buffer zone.” Sparsely populated and stripped of political and military power, the region would be unable to interfere with Mongol operations on other fronts. In this respect, perhaps, Israel’s security zones in Lebanon, Syria and, of course, Gaza bear some resemblance to those of the Mongols, though not in scale.

But that is only part of the story. Chinggis Khan and his immediate successors, well into the second half of the 13th century, displayed exceptional strategic vision and generally succeeded in putting it into practice. They were acutely aware of the logistical challenges facing their armies, organized into units of mounted archers. Above all, they needed to secure pasture and water for the hundreds of thousands of horses they took on campaign.

Here the fundamental difference between the rulers of Mongolia and Israel becomes clear. The Mongols excelled at systematic, rational, long-term thinking. Israel’s thinking in recent years, by contrast, has lacked clear objectives, been shaped by extraneous considerations and come wrapped in bombastic declarations with no serious attention to logistics. Israel’s long-term ambitions bear no relation to the financial, human and other resources at its disposal. In strategic terms, then, I find it insulting to compare Israel under its current leadership to Chinggis Khan’s Mongol Empire. The Mongols deserve more credit.

Let us return to that Mongol “buffer zone,” this time in the context of the bitter war fought from 1260 to 1320 between the Mongols in and around Iran, whose state was known as the Ilkhanate, and the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria (which of course included the Land of Israel). The territory along the Euphrates and what is now the official border between Syria and Turkey was a frontier marked by raids from both sides, espionage, secret agents moving in both directions, terror and violence. Every few years, the Mongols also launched major campaigns into Syria. With one exception, the Mamluks always defeated them and drove them out.

On the eastern bank of the Euphrates, which they controlled, the Mongols created a “buffer zone” where cities and towns lay almost entirely in ruins and few inhabitants remained. Conditions on the Mamluk side were much better. In at least some towns and cities, normal life continued, with even a degree of prosperity. The Mamluks, in other words, adopted a different strategic approach, one that did not rely on sowing destruction and proved effective over time.

For various reasons, after roughly 60 years, the Mongol leadership in Iran and the surrounding territories finally “threw in the towel” and sought peace with the Mamluks. They even signed an actual peace treaty in 1323. Israel, take note: The destruction in the buffer zone appears not to have strengthened the Mongol state militarily. It did cause social and economic decline across a vast region, with consequences that endured long afterward.

It is fascinating to see how two bitter enemies eventually reconciled despite all the hostility and grievances accumulated over a fierce struggle that lasted several generations and even took on elements of holy war on both sides. To my mind, this offers a little hope for our situation here in the Levant. I suspect many Mongolians today know little of the peace processes between their ancestors and the Mamluks. I imagine they would take satisfaction in hearing about this historical precedent for reconciliation. They certainly would not find it insulting.

Prof. Reuven Amitai studies the history of the Mongols in the Middle East and their Mamluk rivals.

Source: HAARETZ

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